University of Tulsa College of Law

TU Law Digital Commons
Articles, Chapters in Books and Other Contributions to Scholarly Works

2015

The Search for Meaning in the Notice
Requirements of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act: A 30 for 30 Short
Johnny Parker

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/fac_pub
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
43 Cap. U. L. Rev. 201 (2015).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles, Chapters in Books
and Other Contributions to Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
daniel-bell@utulsa.edu.

THE SEARCH FOR MEANING IN THE NOTICE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION
PRACTICES ACT: A 30 FOR 30 SHORT
JOHNNY PARKER *

Debt collectors generate more complaints to the FTC than
any other industry. Although many debt collectors are
careful to comply with consumer protection laws, others
engage in illegal conduct. Some collectors harass and
threaten consumers, demand larger payments than the law
allows, refuse to verify disputed debts, and disclose debts
to consumers’ employers, co-workers, family members,
and friends. Debt collection abuses cause harms that
financially vulnerable consumers can ill afford. Many
consumers pay collectors money they do not owe and fall
deeper into debt, while others suffer invasions of their
privacy, job loss, and domestic instability. 1

I. INTRODUCTION
The first place to look for answers to what is or is not permitted when
dealing with a debt collector is the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA or the Act). The basic provisions of the law fall into three
broadly defined categories—prohibitions, required disclosures, and civil
liability. 2 Prohibited conduct includes: (1) communication with the
consumer at any unusual or inconvenient time or place 3 and, with a few
exceptions, communications with third parties; 4 (2) “conduct the natural
consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse[;]” 5 (3) the use of
Copyright © 2015, Johnny Parker.
*
Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law; B.A., 1982, University of
Mississippi; J.D., 1984, University of Mississippi College of Law; LL.M., 1986, Columbia
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1
Debt Collection: Federal Trade Commission Protecting America’s Consumers,
FTC.GOV,
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/consumer-finance/debtcollection (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).
2
See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2012).
3
§ 1692c(a)(1).
4
§ 1692c(b).
5
§ 1692d.
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“any false, deceptive, or misleading representation[;]” 6 (4) the use of unfair
and unconscionable means to collect any debt; 7 and, (5) furnishing
deceptive forms. 8 The prohibitions against harassment or abuse, false or
misleading representations, and unfair practices are illustrated by lists of
per se violations. 9 These lists are intended only as examples of prohibited
conduct and are not all-inclusive. 10
Couched in the broadest possible language, the civil liability provision
of the law provides: “Except as otherwise provided by this section, any
debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this subchapter
with respect to any person is liable to such person . . . .” 11
As a consequence of the phrase “any person,” the civil liability
provision has been construed to provide standing to enforce the provisions
of the FDCPA to debtors and non-debtors, in addition to consumers. 12
However, the standing inquiry turns upon the section of the law allegedly
violated. 13 For example, § 1692e states, “A debt collector may not use any
false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with
the collection of any debt.” 14 When read in conjunction with the civil
liability provision, § 1692e has been construed to mean “any aggrieved
party may bring an action under § 1692e.” 15

6

§ 1692e.
§ 1692f.
8
§ 1692j.
9
§§ 1692d–1692f.
10
Id. In each of these sections the Code expressly provides that: “Without limiting the
general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this
section . . . .” See also Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993); McMillan
v. Collection Prof’ls, Inc., 455 F.3d 754, 763 (7th Cir. 2006).
11
§ 1692k(a).
12
See Beck v. Maximus, Inc., 457 F.3d 291, 294 (3d Cir. 2006).
13
Barasch v. Estate Info. Servs., No. 07-CV-1963, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79338, at *5,
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2009).
14
§ 1692e.
15
Wright v. Fin. Serv. of Norwalk, Inc., 22 F.3d 647, 649–50 (6th Cir. 1994). For
purposes of a § 1692e claim, standing has been construed to include persons who have been
harmed by an improper debt collection practice, someone standing in the alleged debtor’s
shoes, or someone who has suffered injurious exposure to the communication. See Dutton
v. Wolhar, 809 F. Supp. 1130, 1134 (D.Del. 1992); Sibersky v. Goldstein, 155 F. App’x 10,
11 (2d Cir. 2005); Guillory v. WFS Fin., Inc., No. C 06-06963, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24910, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2007).
7
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Despite the broad language of the civil liability provision, “only a
consumer has standing to sue under particular sections of the FDCPA that
specifically regulate communications with the consumer.” 16 Section
1692g is such a provision. 17 Successful litigants who sue to enforce the
FDCPA’s provisions may recover actual damages, statutory damages, and
attorney fees. 18
The FDCPA applies to the collection of personal, family, or household
debts only. 19 The Act’s protections to consumers are contingent upon the
Act’s definition of the terms “communication,” 20 “consumer,” 21
“creditor,” 22 “debt,” 23 and “debt collector.” 24 The FDCPA’s protective
power primarily emphasizes communication between a debt collector and
16

Barasch, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79338, at *5 (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Several sections of the FDCPA, including § 1692g, restrict the scope of
the FDCPA’s application by including the word “consumer” in the text. See, e.g., Crafton
v. Law Firm of Jonathan Levine, 957 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1001 (E.D. Wis. 2013); Tedeschi v.
Kason Credit Corp., No. 3:10CV00612, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51806, at *8 (D. Conn.
Apr. 15, 2014).
17
§ 1692g(a). See also Crafton, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 1001.
18
§ 1692k(a)(1)–(3).
19
§ 1692a(5).
20
“The term ‘communication’ means the conveying of information regarding a debt
directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.” § 1692a(2).
21
“The term ‘consumer’ means any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to
pay any debt.” § 1692a(3).
22

§ 1692a(4) (“The term ‘creditor’ means any person who offers or extends
credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed, but such term does not include
any person to the extent that he receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in
default solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another.”).
23

§ 1692a(5) (“The term ‘debt’ means any obligation or alleged obligation of
a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money,
property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such
obligation has been reduced to judgment.”).
24

§ 1692a(6) (“The term ‘debt collector’ means any person who uses any
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal
purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or
attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be
owed or due another.”) The term does not include persons expressly excluded
from the definition of “debt collector” in the Act. See § 1692a(6)(A)–(F).
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consumer.
Consequently, a court must determine whether a
communication between a debt collector and consumer has occurred before
imposing liability under the FDCPA. 25
The FDCPA establishes certain rights for consumers whose debts are
placed in the hands of professional debt collectors for collection. It is
largely a strict liability statute. 26 Thus, debt collectors are liable
regardless of whether the violation was knowing or intentional. 27 Because
the FDCPA is a strict liability statute, proof of one violation is sufficient to
support judgment in favor of the plaintiff. 28
The FDCPA focuses on collection methods and not whether the
underlying debt is valid. 29 Consequently, the plaintiff has standing to sue
under the FDCPA regardless of whether a valid debt exists. 30 “A basic
tenet of the [FDCPA]” is that every consumer, even one who mismanages
his or her personal finances by defaulting on his or her debts, is entitled
“to be treated in a reasonable and civil manner.” 31 Thus, a plaintiff who

25

The FDCPA does not apply to creditors seeking to collect their own debts. See
Schlosser v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., 323 F.3d 534, 536 (7th Cir. 2003); F.T.C. v. Check
Investors, Inc., 502 F.3d 159, 171 (3d Cir. 2007); Maguire v. Citicorp Retail Servs., Inc.,
147 F.3d 232, 235 (2d Cir. 1998). However, a creditor, seeking to collect its own debt,
becomes subject to the Act if it uses a name other than its own which would indicate that a
third party is collecting or seeking to collect such debt. See Bridge v. Ocwen Fed. Bank,
FSB, 681 F.3d 355, 360 (6th Cir. 2012); Maguire, 147 F.3d at 235. “A creditor uses a
name other than its own when it uses a name that implies that a third party is involved in
collecting its debts, ‘pretends to be someone else’ or ‘uses a pseudonym or alias.’”
Macguire, 147 F.3d at 235. A creditor is not required to use its full business name or its
name of incorporation when collecting its own debts. Id. Commonly used acronyms, the
name under which it ordinarily transacts business, or any name that it has used from the
inception of the credit relation are sufficient to exempt creditors from the application of the
FDCPA. Id.
26
See Reichert v. Nat’l Credit Sys., Inc., 531 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2008); Owen v.
I.C. Sys., Inc., 629 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2011).
27
See Reichert, 531 F.3d at 1005; Owen, 629 F.3d at 1270.
28
Macarz v. Transworld Sys. Inc., 26 F. Supp. 2d 368, 373 (D. Conn. 1998); Clomon
v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993).
29
Senftle v. Landau, 390 F. Supp. 2d 463, 464, 470 (D. Md. 2005).
30
Baker v. G. C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 777 (9th Cir. 1982).
31
McMillan v. Collection Prof’ls, Inc., 455 F.3d 754, 762 n. 10 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Bass v. Stolper, Koritzinsky, Brewster & Neider, S.C., 111 F.3d 1322, 1324 (7th Cir.
1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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“owes a legitimate debt has standing to sue [under the FDCPA] if the Act
is violated by an [unscrupulous] debt collector.” 32
This Article examines 15 U.S.C. § 1692g and its requirement that debt
collectors provide consumers certain specified information when
attempting to collect debts. 33 Part II sets the stage for this examination by
providing a general overview of the nature, character, and content of the
FDCPA. 34 Thereafter, Part II(A) discusses the mandate that debt collectors
provide the information specified in § 1692g. 35 It also explains the
objective of § 1692g and the intent that the information serves
Part II(B) explores each subsection of § 1692g
consumers. 36
individually. 37 It examines decisional law explaining the manner, content,
and context in which the specified information must be conveyed to
consumers. 38 Part II(C) identifies the two ways the FDCPA can be
violated and discusses the least sophisticated consumer legal standard
involved in one of the violations. 39 This section also discusses the proof
requirement under this standard. 40 Finally, this Article expressly ends
where it implicitly began: consumers only have one recourse if they are to
protect themselves from overzealous debt collectors—to know their rights
and to demand accountability. 41

II. ANALYSIS
A. The Information Required To Be Communicated
In addition to the prohibitions against “false, deceptive, or misleading
representation[s]” and “conduct the natural consequence of which is to
harass, oppress, or abuse,” 42 the Act affords consumers with specified
rights to information about the alleged debt. The right to verify or validate
32

Robey v. Shapiro, Marianos & Cejda, L.L.C., 434 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 307 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
33
See infra Part II.A.
34
See infra Part II.A.
35
See infra Part II.A.
36
See infra Part II.A.
37
See infra Part II.B.
38
See infra Part II.B.
39
See infra Part II.C.
40
See infra Part II.C.
41
See infra Part III.
42
§§ 1692d–1692e (2012).
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the existence of the debt is chief among these rights. 43 Not all
communications from a debt collector to a consumer need to be in
writing. 44 However, unless the required information is provided in the
initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692g requires a debt collector to send a written communication
informing the consumer of his or her right to dispute and obtain specific
information regarding the alleged debt. 45 The debt collector typically
sends this communication in the form of a collection letter.
Section 1692g “is aimed at preventing collection efforts based on
mistaken information.” 46 It is a strict liability provision and is violated
whenever a debt collector fails to provide the required notice, regardless of
whether the lack of disclosure was egregious or caused any actual harm. 47
Section 1692g restricts the scope of the FDCPA’s application by including
the word “consumer” in the text. 48 According to the Act:
Within five days after the initial communication with a
consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a
debt collector shall, unless the following information is
contained in the initial communication or the consumer
has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice
containing—
(1) the amount of the debt;
(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;
(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty
days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the
debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be
valid by the debt collector;
(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt
collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the
debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector
43

§ 1692g(a).
§ 1692a(2).
45
§ 1692g(a).
46
Schlosser v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., 323 F.3d 534, 537 (7th Cir. 2003).
47
See Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 33, 35–36 (2d Cir. 1996).
48
See § 1692g. The FDCPA defines “consumer” as “any natural person obligated or
allegedly obligated to pay any debt.” § 1692a(3).
44
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will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment
against the consumer and a copy of such verification or
judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt
collector; and
(5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s written
request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will
provide the consumer with the name and address of the
original creditor, if different from the current creditor. 49
The initial written communication must also disclose that the “debt
collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained
will be used for that purpose.” 50
Congress’s use of the term “shall” unambiguously manifests the
mandatory nature of the provision’s notice requirement, at least as the U.S.
Supreme Court has established in other contexts. 51 In fact, every circuit
court of appeals to address the issue of whether or not the information
required by § 1692g is collectively mandatory has answered in the
affirmative. 52 The information required by § 1692g is required “regardless
of whether validation notice is needed or not.” 53 Thus, even if the
consumer already knows or has access to the information, it still must be
provided in the collection letter.
The FDCPA does not assume that a consumer who receives a
collection letter is aware of her rights.54 “Instead, the Act requires the debt
collector, as the party in the better position to know the law, to inform the
consumer of that right.” 55 The validation notice guarantees that the
consumer receives the information necessary to challenge the alleged debt
before making payments to the independent collection agency. 56
49

§ 1692g(a)(1)–(5).
§ 1692e(11).
51
See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 607 (1989); Pierce v.
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 569–70 (1988).
52
See Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc. 516 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2008); Frey v.
Gangwish, 970 F.2d 1516, 1518–19 (6th Cir. 1992); McMillan v. Collection Prof’ls, Inc.,
455 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2006); Riggs v. Prober & Raphael, 681 F.3d 1097, 1099–1100
(9th Cir. 2012); Ferree v. Marianos, No. 97-6061, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 30361, at *6
(10th Cir. Nov. 3, 1997).
53
Frey, 970 F.2d at 1519.
54
Jacobson, 516 F.3d at 90.
55
Id.
56
Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 1996).
50
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Section 1692g only requires a debt collector to send the consumer a
written notice containing the required information. 57 It does not require
the debt collector to verify actual receipt of the notice by the consumer. 58
However, because the objective of § 1692g is to inform consumers of their
rights, 59 merely sending the notice to any address without knowing if it is
valid or if it belongs to the consumer might frustrate the purpose of the
statute and result in an “abusive debt collection practice.” 60
B. Failure to Provide the Required Information
A debt collector can violate § 1692g in two ways. 61 First, failing to
provide the information required by the statute constitutes a violation. 62
The second violation occurs when other language in the collection letter
contradicts or overshadows the statutorily mandated language. 63
1. Subsection (a)(1): Amount of Debt
Section 1692g(a)(1) requires that the debt collector send the amount of
the debt to the consumer in a written notice, “unless [that] information is
contained in the initial communication or the consumer has already paid
the debt.” 64 Courts have held that a notice is inadequate if it does not
indicate that the amount due reflects the current balance, and interest may

57

See § 1692g(a). See also Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 498 (7th Cir. 1997); Mahon
v. Credit Bureau of Placer Cnty., Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1999).
58
See Mahon, 171 F.3d at 1201. It is unsettled whether “send” implies receipt by the
debtor or simply mailing by the debt collector. Compare Maloy v. Phillips, 64 F.3d 607,
608 (11th Cir. 1995) (the statute of limitations for an FDCPA violation begins running as of
the date the collection letter is mailed), with Bates v. C&S Adjusters, Inc., 980 F.2d 865,
868 (2d Cir. 1992) (an FDCPA violation does not occur until the debtor’s receipt of the
collection notice).
59
See Kim v. Gordon, No. CV 10-1086, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85353, at * 8 (D. Or.
Aug. 1, 2011); Laprade v. Abramson, No. 97-10, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9009, at * 13
(D.D.C. June 19, 1997).
60
Campbell v. Credit Bureau Sys., Inc., No. 08-CV-177, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5762,
at *32 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 27, 2009).
61
See DeSantis v. Computer Credit, Inc., 269 F.3d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 2001); McMillan
v. Collection Prof’ls Inc., 455 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2006).
62
See DeSantis, 269 F.3d at 161; McMillan, 455 F.3d at 758.
63
See DeSantis, F.3d at 161; McMillan, 455 F.3d at 758.
64
15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1) (2012).
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65

be added to the total. “[O]ther courts have held that a [collection letter]
satisfies the statute if it states the total amount of the debt (including
interest and any other charges) as of the date the letter is sent.” 66
In Miller v. McCalla, Raymer, Padrick, Cobb, Nichols & Clark,
L.L.C., 67 the court created a “safe harbor” formula for compliance with
§ 1692g(a)(1). 68 The collection letter in Miller said that the “‘unpaid
principal balance’ of the loan was $178,844.65, but added that ‘this
amount does not include accrued but unpaid interest, unpaid late charges,
escrow advances or other charges for preservation and protection of the
lender’s interest in the property, as authorized by your loan agreement.’” 69
It also provided “[t]he amount to reinstate or pay off your loan changes
daily. You may call our office for complete reinstatement and payoff
figures.” 70 An 800 number was also provided. 71
According to the court in Miller, this information did not satisfy the
requirements of subsection (a)(1) because “[t]he unpaid principal balance
is not the debt; it is only a part of the debt; the Act requires statement of
the debt.” 72 In a case where the amount due varies daily, the Miller court
would accept this type of statement:
As of the date of this letter, you owe $__ [the exact
amount due]. Because of interest, late charges, and other
charges that may vary from day to day, the amount due on
the day you pay may be greater. Hence, if you pay the
amount shown above, an adjustment may be necessary
after we receive your check, in which event we will inform
you before depositing the check for collection. For further
information, write the undersigned or call 1–800– [phone
number]. 73
65

Carr v. Northland Grp., No. 3:12-CV-378, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174930, at *10
(E.D. Tenn. Dec. 11, 2012) (quoting King v. Alliance Receivables Mgmt., Inc., No. 2:12CV-314, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14428, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 5, 2012) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
66
Id. at 10–11.
67
214 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2000).
68
Id. at 876.
69
Id. at 875.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 876.
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So long as the information provided in this statement is clear and accurate,
the debt collector will not violate the “amount of the debt” provision. 74
2. Subsection (a)(2): Name of the Creditor and Least Sophisticated
Consumer
Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2), “[w]ithin five days after the
initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of
any debt, a debt collector shall . . . send the consumer a written notice
containing . . . (2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.” 75
“Limited case law exists regarding violations of § 1692g(a)(2) for a debt
collector’s failure to identify the creditor’s name in a communication with
the consumer.” 76 It has also been suggested that the language of
§ 1692g(a)(2) has not been strictly applied. 77 Nevertheless, the statute
requires the collector to provide this information, so a plaintiff is not
required to demonstrate that it is material to the communication. 78
§ 1692g(a)(2) claims are generally analyzed from the perspective of
the least sophisticated consumer. 79 Pursuant to the least sophisticated
consumer standard, § 1692g(a)(2) has been violated when the least
sophisticated consumer would not deduce from reading the collection letter
that the name of the creditor seeking collection is the creditor to whom the
debt is owed. 80
Courts have struggled to consistently determine whether § 1692g(a)(2)
has been violated in the context of home mortgage loans. For example, in
Olson v. Wilford, Geske, & Cook, P.A., 81 the defendant, who was a law
firm, sent the plaintiffs a form collection letter that provided, in pertinent
part:
Our office has been retained by Bank of America, N.A.
and The Bank of New York Mellon fka The Bank of New
74

Id.
15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(2) (2012).
76
Devito v. Zucker, Goldberg & Ackerman, LLC, 908 F. Supp. 2d 564, 569 (D.N.J.
2012).
77
Id.
78
Lee v. Forster & Garbus, LLP, 926 F. Supp. 2d 482, 488 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
79
See, e.g., Devito, 908 F. Supp. 2d at 568–69; Sparkman v. Zwicker & Assocs., P.C.,
374 F. Supp. 2d 293, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
80
Sparkman, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 300–01.
81
No. 12-1895, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17365 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2013).
75
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York, as Trustee, for The Benefit of the Certificateholders
of CWALT, Inc., Alternative Loan Trust 2005-33CB
Mortgage Pass-Through Certificate, Series 2005-33CB,
which is the creditor, or the servicer for the creditor, to
which your mortgage debt is owed. Your loan is in default
under the terms of your mortgage dated April 28, 2005,
and the creditor has referred this matter to our office to
commence foreclosure proceedings . . . . 82
The plaintiffs claimed the letter violated § 1692g(a)(2) because it did not
identify the creditor as required by the section. 83 According to the
plaintiffs, the letter stated that Wilford had “been retained by two different
banks[,] . . . that one or both banks is the trustee [for the Certificate holder]
and that one of these entities is either ‘the creditor, or servicer for the
creditor, to which your mortgage debt is owed.’” 84 While acknowledging
that the letter was poorly drafted, the court in Olson found that the letter
identified “both entities as ‘the creditor, or the servicer for the creditor,’”
and thus, “in fact contain[ed] the name of the creditor to whom the debt
[was] owed.” 85 Consequently, it concluded that the letter did not violate
subsection (a)(2). 86
In Zapp v. Trott & Trott, P.C., 87 the court addressed the exact same
issue as in Olson and reached a contrary decision. 88 In Zapp, the plaintiff
received a letter from Trott & Trott that provided, in relevant part: “This
office represents CitiMortgage, Inc., which is the creditor to which your
mortgage debt is owed or the loan servicer for the creditor to which the
mortgage debt is owed.” 89
Plaintiff alleged that the letter violated the FDCPA because it failed to
identify her creditor as required by § 1692g(a)(2). 90 Defendant cited
“Olson v. Wilford, Geske & Cook . . . for the proposition that the same
language at issue here—‘the creditor to which your mortgage debt is owed
or the loan servicer for the creditor to which the mortgage debt is owed’—
82

Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *3–4.
84
Id. at *8 (quoting Complaint at 2, Olson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17365).
85
Id. at *8–9.
86
Id. at *9.
87
No. 13-12998, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176511 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2013).
88
Id. at *2, *6.
89
Id. at *1 (quoting Complaint at 14, Zapp, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176511).
90
Id. at *2.
83
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is not violative the FDCPA.” 91 The court in Zapp distinguished Olson on
the basis that “[t]he Olson court’s interpretation—that a collection letter
must simply ‘contain’ the name of the creditor—is contrary to the ‘least
sophisticated consumer’ standard and to other cases requiring that the
information be clearly and effectively conveyed.” 92 Thus, the court
concluded that plaintiff had stated a claim for a violation of § 1692g(a)(2)
because the least sophisticated consumer could be confused by the manner
in which the required information was provided. 93
While the Olson and Zapp holdings seem to be in conflict, the cases
can be harmonized on the basis of the underlying legal theory. The court
in Olson viewed the underlying legal theory as the failure to provide the
required information, 94 while the court in Zapp analyzed the case from the
perspective of a failure to provide the required information in a clear and
effective manner. 95 The least sophisticated consumer standard tends to be
accorded significantly greater weight, due to its fact-sensitive nature.
3. Subsection (a)(3): Right to Dispute Validity of Debt
“Paragraphs 3 through 5 of section 1692g(a) contain the validation
notice—the statements that inform the consumer how to obtain verification
of the debt and that he has thirty days in which to do so.” 96 Subsection
(a)(3) requires debt collectors to inform consumers of their right to dispute
the validity of the debt or any portion thereof within thirty days after
receipt of the notice, not within thirty days of the date of the letter. 97 The
91

Id. at *5–6 (quoting Complaint at 14, Zapp, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176511).
Id. at *6.
93
Id. at *6. The FDCPA does not apply to mortgage servicers as long as the debt was
not in default at the time it was assigned. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii) (2012). Determining
which definition, “debt collector” or “mortgage servicer,” applies depends on the status of
the debt at the time it was acquired, which is governed by § 1692a(6)(F)(iii). See, e.g.,
Pascal v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 33350, at *10–12 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 11, 2013).
94
Olson v. Wilford, Geske, & Cook, P.A., No. 12-1895, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17365,
at *9 (D. Minn. Feb. 8, 2013).
95
Zapp v. Trott & Trott, P.C., No. 13-12998, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176511, at *6
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2013).
96
Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 353–54 (3d Cir. 2000).
97
See § 1692g(a)(3). See also Edstrom v. All Servs. and Processing, No. C04-1514,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2773, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2005); Cavallaro v. Law Office of
Shapiro & Kreisman, 933 F. Supp. 1148, 1154 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
92
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failure to include in the notice that “any portion” of the debt, such as
interest, finance charges, or penalties, can be disputed violates the
FDCPA. 98 According to the plain language of the statute, the letter must
also include some language that makes it clear that the “debt collector”
may assume the debt valid for collection purposes. 99 A statement that
imposes limitations, conditions, or requirements on the consumer’s ability
to exercise the right to dispute the debt or any portion thereof violates the
FDCPA. 100
Courts, however, disagree on whether the dispute referred to in
subsection (a)(3) must be made in writing to the debt collector. 101 In
Graziano v. Harrison, 102 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is the
first and only circuit court to deviate from the plain meaning of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692g(a)(3). In Graziano, an attorney who operated a debt collection
practice sent a notice of a delinquent debt to a debtor. 103 The notice
informed the debtor that “unless he disputed the debt in writing within
thirty days, the debt would be assumed valid.” 104 The debtor posited that,
because the statutory language of subsection (a)(3) does not require a
dispute to be in writing, the attorney’s letter violated § 1692g (a)(3) of the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. 105 The attorney countered that while
98

See Baker v. G. C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1982); Smith v.
Transworld Sys., Inc., 953 F.2d 1025, 1028 (6th Cir. 1992); Lombardi v. Columbia
Recovery Grp LLC, No. C12-1250, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146375, at *7 (W.D. Wash.
Oct. 9, 2013) (explaining that the statement should at a minimum refer to “portion” of the
debt).
99
See Fariasantos v. Rosenberg & Assocs. LLC, No. 3:13CV543, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 30898, at *23–24 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2014); Iyamu v. Clarfield, Okon, Salomone &
Pincus, P.L., 950 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1274 (S.D. Fla. 2013).
100
See Lombardi, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146375, at *11.
101
Compare Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 112 (3d Cir. 1991) (violation notice
requirement that dispute be in writing does not violate § 1692g(a)(3)), and Hooks v.
Forman, Holt, Eliades & Ravin, LLC., 717 F.3d 282, 287 (2d Cir. 2013) (a consumer must
send the debt collector written notice of the dispute), with Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin. Inc.,
430 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2005) (disputes are not required to be made to the debt
collector in writing), and Clark v. Absolute Collection Serv., Inc., 741 F.3d 487, 491 (4th
Cir. 2014) (validation notice’s requirement that dispute be in writing violates subsection
(a)(3)).
102
950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991).
103
Id. at 109.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 112.
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§ 1692g(a)(3) does not contain an expressed writing requirement,
subsections (a)(4) and (a)(5) of the same provision contained a requirement
of writing, which demonstrates a Congressional intent that all disputes be
in writing. 106 According to the attorney, Congress inadvertently omitted
the requirement of a writing in subsection (a)(3). 107 After comparing the
statement required by subsection (a)(3) with those required by subsections
(a)(4) and (a)(5), the court in Graziano observed:
Adopting Graziano’s reading of the statute would thus
create a situation in which, upon the debtor’s non-written
dispute, the debt collector would be without any statutory
ground for assuming that the debt was valid, but
nevertheless would not be required to verify the debt or to
advise the debtor of the identity of the original creditor
and would be permitted to continue debt collection efforts.
We see no reason to attribute to Congress an intent to
create so incoherent a system. 108
The court in Graziano further reasoned that a writing requirement creates a
lasting record of the debt dispute, thus avoiding a source of conflict. 109
Nearly fifteen years after Graziano, the Ninth Circuit, in Camacho v.
Bridgeport Fin. Inc., 110 addressed the issue of whether the imposition of an
expressed writing requirement on a consumer’s rights under subsection
(a)(3) violates the FDCPA. 111 In Camacho, the court concluded that a
consumer need not send a writing to contest the debt under
§ 1692g(a)(3). 112 Relying on the plain meaning of the words, the court
reasoned that the contrasting writing requirements of § 1692g(a)(4) and
(a)(5) manifested congressional intent not to impose a writing requirement
on § 1692g(a)(3). 113 The court concluded that this interpretation was
sound because the statute provides for other protections independent of
subsections (a)(4) and (a)(5) in the event of an oral dispute, and those
protections depend only on whether a debt was disputed, not whether there
106

Id.
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
430 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2005).
111
Id. at 1079.
112
Id. at 1082.
113
Id. at 1081.
107

2014]

FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT

215

114

The Camacho court also reasoned that the
was a prior writing.
legislative purpose of allowing alleged debtors to question and challenge
the initial communication of a collection agency is furthered by permitting
oral objections. 115 Finally, the court observed that its reading—by which
some rights are triggered by an oral dispute but others require a written
statement—would not mislead consumers. 116 While the Third Circuit has
reaffirmed Graziano, 117 two other circuit courts have adopted the
rationales and holding of the Ninth Circuit in Camacho. 118
Camacho only held that debt collectors could not expressly require that
a § 1692g(a)(3) dispute be in writing. 119 Pursuant to Camacho, the
FDCPA allows a debtor to dispute a debt orally or in writing. 120 The court
in Camacho did not address the issue of whether the FDCPA prohibits a
debt collector from implicitly requiring that the subsection (a)(3) dispute
be in writing. 121 However, this specific issue was addressed by the court in
Riggs v. Prober & Raphael. 122 Therein, the court concluded that such an
implication did not violate subsection (a)(3) because “any confusion over
what a consumer must do in writing, versus what she may do in writing,
stems at least in part from the FDCPA itself. It would be untenable to read
the FDCPA to prohibit validation notices that simply mimic the statute’s
own shortcomings.” 123

114

Id. at 1081–82. Once a consumer disputes a debt orally under subsection (a)(3), the
debt collector must refrain from communicating the consumer’s credit information to others
without disclosing the dispute. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8) (2012). In addition, if the consumer
owes multiple debts and makes a payment the debt collector may not apply the payment to
a debt that has been orally disputed. § 1692h. See also Clark v. Absolute Collection Serv.,
Inc., 741 F.3d 487, 491 (4th Cir. 2014).
115
Camacho, 430 F.3d at 1082.
116
Id.
117
Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC, 709 F.3d 142, 148 (3d. Cir.
2013).
118
Hooks v. Forman, Holt, Eliades & Ravin, LLC., 717 F.3d 282, 286 (2d Cir. 2013)
(validation notice’s requirement that dispute be in writing violates subsection (a)(3)); Clark
v. Absolute Collection Serv. Inc., 741 F.3d 487, 491 (4th Cir. 2014) (validation notice’s
requirement that dispute be in writing violates subsection (a)(3)).
119
Camacho, 430 F.3d at 1082.
120
Id. at 1081–82.
121
Riggs v. Prober & Raphael, 681 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2012).
122
681 F.3d at 1102.
123
Id. at 1103.
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4. Subsection (a)(4): Verification of Debt
Section 1692g(a)(4) requires the debt collector to include a written
statement informing the consumer that if he or she informs the debt
collector “within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof,
is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy
of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or
judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.” 124
Subsection (a)(4) expressly requires that the consumer be made aware that
this dispute must be provided in writing. 125 The failure to include the word
“writing” in the statement does not effectively convey to the consumer his
rights and thus, constitutes a violation of the FDCPA.126
The word “dispute” is a term of art in the FDCPA. 127 Consequently, a
consumer can dispute a debt for no reason at all. 128 Therefore, the debt
collector need not and may not require the consumer to “support [the]
written dispute with documentation or explanation.” 129
“The text of § 1692g (a)(4) leaves no room for deviation.” 130 It
requires the debt collector, upon receipt of a written dispute from the
consumer, to “obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment.” 131
If the validation notice makes any lesser representation, such as “might
obtain” or “will try to obtain,” the letter violates § 1692g(a)(4). 132
A validation notice that uses the verbatim language of § 1692g(a)(4)
does not violate the FDCPA. 133 Likewise, a de minimis variance from the
literal requirements of subsection (a)(4) does not violate the Act. 134 For
124

15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) (2012).
See id.
126
See, e.g., McCabe v. Crawford & Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 736, 743 (N.D. Ill. 2003);
Spira v. Consiglio, Parisi & Allen, No. 99-CV-870, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24497, at *13
(E.D.N.Y Jan. 3, 2001).
127
Gruber v. Creditors’ Prot. Servs., No. 12-C-1243, 2013 U.S Dist. LEXIS 68379, at
*6 (E.D. Wis. May 14, 2013).
128
See DeSantis v. Computer Credit, Inc., 269 F.3d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 2001).
129
See, e.g., King v. Int’l Data Servs., No. 01-00380, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26427, at
*9, *12 (D. Haw. Aug. 5, 2002) (citing DeSantis, 269 F.3d at 162).
130
Jang v. A.M. Miller & Assocs. Nos. 95 C 4919, 95 C 6665, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10883, at *10 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 1996).
131
15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) (2012).
132
Jang, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10883, at *10–11.
133
Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin. Inc., 430 F.3d. 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2005).
134
See Gruber, 2013 U.S Dist. LEXIS 68379, at *4.
125
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example, in the appellate case of Gruber v. Creditors’ Prot. Servs., Inc., 135
the collection letter, in response to the requirement of subsection (a)(4),
provided: “If you notify this office within 30 days from receiving this
notice, this office will obtain verification of the debt or obtain a copy of the
judgment and mail you a copy of such judgment or verification.” 136 This
statement, according to the debtor, violated the FDCPA because it omitted
the phrase “that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed.” 137 Thus,
according to the plaintiffs, the statement “direct[ed] the consumer to
request verification instead of directing the consumer to dispute the
debt.” 138
The court rejected this argument and concluded that “a request to
verify the existence of a debt constitutes a ‘dispute’ under the
[FDCPA].” 139 The court further opined that “unsophisticated consumers”
cannot be expected to assert legal rights precisely, so if a consumer sought
verification, he would be disputing the debt for all practical purposes and
would be protected according to the Act. 140
5. Subsection (a)(5): Name of Original Creditor Versus Current
Creditor
Subsection (a)(5) requires that the debt collector provide a statement
that, upon the consumers “written request,” the debt collector will provide
the contact information of the original creditor, if different from the current
creditor. 141 As stated in the context of the discussion of subsection (a)(4),
if the collection letter uses the verbatim language of the statute, the
FDCPA has not been violated. 142 One caveat to this rule exists where
other language in the collection letter contradicts the verbatim language of
the statute. 143

135

742 F.3d 271 (7th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 273.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 274.
140
Id.
141
15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5) (2012).
142
See supra Part II.B.4. See also Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin. Inc., 430 F.3d. 1078,
1082 (9th Cir. 2005).
143
Compare Ardino v. Lyons, No. 11-848, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143586, at *20–32
(D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2011), with Philip v. Sardo & Batista, P.C., No. 11-4773, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 130267, at *6–9 (D.N.J Nov. 10, 2011).
136
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Section 1692g(a)(4)–(5) expressly states a debt collector must inform
the consumer that the request has to be in writing. 144 Every district court to
address this issue has held that omission of the phrase “in writing” in a
collection letter violates subsections (a)(4)–(5) of the FDCPA. 145 The
single rationale in these cases is that oral notice of dispute of a debt has
different legal consequences than written notice.146 For example,
§ 1692g(b) provides that if the consumer notifies the debt collector of a
dispute in writing within the thirty-day period, the debt collector must
cease collection efforts until he obtains the verification or information
required by § 1692g(a)(4)–(5). 147 However, “if the consumer disputes the
debt orally rather than in writing, the consumer losses the protections
afforded by § 1692g(b); the debt collector is under no obligation to cease
all collection efforts and obtain verification of the debt.” 148 Thus, debtors
can trigger the rights under subsection (a)(3) by either an oral or written
dispute, while debtors can trigger the rights under subsections (a)(4) and
(a)(5) only through written dispute. 149
One issue that has divided the federal district courts is whether debt
collectors must comply with the literal requirements of subsection (a)(5)
where the current creditor listed in the collection letter is the original
creditor. For example, in the district court case of McCabe v. Crawford &
Co., 150 the collection letter provided, in pertinent part:
Unless we hear from you within thirty (30) days after the
receipt of this letter disputing the claim, Federal Law
provides that this debt will be assumed to be valid and
owing. In the event you contact us and dispute the charges
owed, we will promptly furnish you with any and all
documentation to substantiate the claim. 151

144

§§ 1692g(a)(4)–(5).
See, e.g., Osborn v. EKPSZ, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 859, 870 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
146
Id. at 869.
147
§ 1692g(b).
148
Osborn, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 869. See also supra note 114 for discussion of the legal
consequences of disputing a debt orally.
149
Osborn, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 869 (quoting Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin. Inc., 430 F.3d
1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2005).
150
210 F.R.D. 631 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
151
Id. at 636.
145
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The consumer argued that the debt collector’s letter violated subsection
(a)(5) because it failed to provide the name and address of the original
creditor. 152 The court, however, disagreed and concluded that the FDCPA
did not require such notice where the creditors remained the same. 153
Similarly, in Shimek v. Weissman, Nowack, Curry & Wilco, P.C., 154
the plaintiffs alleged a § 1692g(a)(5) violation because the defendant failed
to provide the name and address of the original creditor or only provided
the name but not the address. 155 The defendant argued that it did not have
to include “the 1692g(a)(5) language in its debt collection letter when the
current creditor [was] the original creditor.” 156
According to the court in Shimek, “It is undisputed that the letters
indicate that the homeowners associations are both the original and current
creditors, Defendant’s letter does not include the Section 1692g(a)(5)
language quoted above, and Defendant’s letter does not provide the
address of the homeowners associations.” 157 Based on its interpretation of
the plain statutory language and the plaintiff’s failure to cite any authority
to the contrary, the Shimek court concluded that the “[d]efendant [had]
complied with the FDCPA by providing the name of the creditor to whom
the debt was owed.” 158 The court based its rationale on the fact that the
letter sent to the debtor expressly identified the homeowners association as
the original creditor, and the association was the current creditor when the
defendant sent the letter. 159 This reasoning, while not novel, 160 has
influenced federal district courts in numerous circuits. 161
The extent to which the court in Shimek was influenced by the
plaintiff’s failure to cite authority to the contrary is uncertain. That said,
authority to the contrary does exist. For example, in Edstrom v. All

152

Id. at 639.
Id.
154
323 F. Supp. 2d 1344 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
155
Id. at 1347–48.
156
Id. at 1348.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 1348–49.
159
Id. at 1348.
160
See, e.g., Cavallaro v. Law Office of Shapiro & Kreisman, 933 F. Supp. 1148, 1154
(E.D.N.Y. 1996).
161
See, e.g., Berndt v. Fairfield Resorts, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1132 (W.D. Wis.
2004); Forsberg v. Fidelity Nat’l Credit Servs., Ltd., No. 03CV2193, 2004 WL 3510771
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2004).
153
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Services and Processing, 162 the plaintiff argued that the debt collector
violated subsection (a)(5) where it merely provided the name but not the
address of the original creditor. 163 The defendant contended that it was not
required to provide this information where the consumer already knew
it. 164 According to the court,
The letter included the name of the original creditor, the
Apple Hill Association, but did not provide the
Association’s address or notify plaintiffs of their right to
request the address. While defendant contends that
plaintiff knew the Association’s address because they sent
a notice to the Association within the thirty-day time
period, this is not relevant to my determination of whether
the letter violated section 1692g. 165
Relying on the unambiguous language of § 1692g, the court concluded that
the notice “must contain the enumerated disclosures.” 166 Thus, the failure
of the defendant’s collection letter to provide the required information
violated the Act. 167
Although inconsistent, the decisional law regarding whether a debt
collector must provide the statement required by subsection (a)(5) is based
on various interpretations of the literal language of § 1692g(a)(5). Courts
that adhere to the view that the collector is not required to provide the
statement where the current creditor and original creditor are the same
construe the phrase “if different from the current creditor” 168 as a condition
precedent to the statutory obligation to provide the statement in the first
instance. However, this interpretation is premised on the original creditor
and the current creditor being the same and the collection letter expressly
stating the name of the creditor.

162

No. C04-1514, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2773 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2005).
Id. at *10–12.
164
Id. at *12.
165
Id. at *11–12.
166
Id. at *12.
167
Id. at *10–11.
168
15. U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5) (2012).
163
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C. Other Language in the Collection Letter Contradicts or Overshadows
the Required Information
Courts have long interpreted § 1692g to require that the validation
notice be conveyed effectively to consumers.169 Mere inclusion of the
required information does not automatically satisfy this requirement. 170
Rather, in order to be conveyed effectively, the required information must
be placed in such a way as to be easily readable and must be prominent
enough to be noticed by the least sophisticated consumer. 171 The
information must also not be overshadowed or contradicted by other
language in the initial communication. 172
Decisional law has not specified which part of § 1692g is the source of
the “overshadowing” prohibition. Some courts have analyzed the
prohibition from the perspective of § 1692g(a), 173 while others refer to
“In 2006, Congress amended the FDCPA
§ 1692g generally. 174
by . . . adding two sentences to the end of subsection (b) of § 1692g.” 175
Those new sentences provide:
Collection activities and communications that do not
otherwise violate this subchapter [i.e. the FDCPA] may
continue during the 30-day period referred to in subsection
(a) of this section unless the consumer has notified the
debt collector in writing that the debt, or any portion of the
debt, is disputed or that the consumer requests the name
and address of the original creditor. Any collection
activities and communication during the 30-day period
may not overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure

169

See, e.g., Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1997); Miller v. Payco-Gen.
Am. Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1991); Swanson v. S. Oregon Credit Serv.,
Inc., 869 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1988).
170
See, e.g., Miller, 943 F.2d at 484; Swanson, 869 F.2d at 1225.
171
See United States v. Nat’l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 139 (4th Cir. 1996);
Swanson, 869 F.2d at 1225.
172
See Nat’l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d at 139; Miller, 943 F.2d at 484.
173
See, e.g., Nat’l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d at 139; Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs.,
Inc., 516 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2008).
174
See, e.g., Talbott v. GC Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 53 F. Supp. 2d 846, 852 (W.D. Va.
1999); Creighton v. Emporia Credit Serv., Inc., 981 F. Supp. 411, 415–16 (E.D. Va. 1997).
175
Garcia-Contreras v. Brock & Scott, PLLC, 775 F. Supp. 2d 808, 813 (M.D. N.C.
2011).
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of the consumer’s right to dispute the debt or request the
name and address of the original creditor.176
Since the 2006 amendment to § 1692g(b), courts have reached differing
conclusions as to whether overshadowing claims involving initial
communications are governed by the new language in § 1692g(b), still
implicitly governed by § 1692g(a), or both. 177
Courts employ a least sophisticated or unsophisticated consumer
standard to determine whether the statutorily required language is
contradicted or overshadowed by other language in the collection letter. 178
This objective inquiry is directed toward protecting all consumers, from
the gullible to the astute. 179 “The test is how the least sophisticated
consumer—one not having the astuteness of a [lawyer] or even the
sophistication of the average, every day, common consumer—understands
the notice he or she receives.” 180 The manner in which the least
sophisticated consumer standard is applied in the context of an
overshadowing claim is affected by the pleading, which, in turn, dictates
the proof requirement. For example, if the consumer is seeking actual
damages, proof that a plaintiff read the letter and was misled is required to
prove that other language in the collection letter overshadowed the
Ultimately, the evidence must
statutorily required information. 181
demonstrate that the least sophisticated consumer would have been misled
under similar circumstances. Because the FDCPA does not impose a
mandatory duty on consumers to read collection letters, 182 proof that the
176

Garcias-Contreras, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 813–14 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (2012)).
For a detailed discussion of the legal implications of the source of an
“overshadowing” claim, see Garcia-Contreras, 775 F. Supp. 2d 808. See also Osborn v.
EKPSZ, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 859, 868 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (citing to subsection (b) of
§ 1692g as the source of an “overshadowing claim”).
178
See Ferree v. Marianos, No. 97-6061, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 30361, at *7 (10th
Cir. Nov. 3, 1997). “The Seventh Circuit employs an ‘unsophisticated debtor’ standard,
which appears to differ from the majority [least sophisticated consumer] test only in
semantics. Gonzales v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 660 F.3d 1055, 1061 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2011).
“The ‘least sophisticated debtor’ or ‘least sophisticated consumer’ standard is employed by
the majority of circuits.” Id.
179
Riggs v. Prober & Raphael, 681 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2012); Easterling v.
Collecto, Inc., 692 F.3d 229, 233 (2d Cir. 2012).
180
Ferree, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 30361, at *5.
181
Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497, 499 (7th Cir. 1997).
182
See id.
177
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letter was actually read by consumer is not necessary to allege a violation
of the FDCPA when the consumer seeks statutory damages only. 183 The
only requirement is proof that the statute was violated. 184 In this context,
the least sophisticated consumer standard is used to discern whether a
reasonable consumer would conclude, based on the language of the letter,
that the statute has been violated.185
The “least sophisticated consumer” is a hypothetical consumer who is
“presumed to possess a rudimentary amount of information about the
world and a willingness to read a collection notice with some care.” 186 The
relevant question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that an
unsophisticated consumer who has carefully considered the contents of the
collection letter might be misled. 187 The standard assumes that the
collection letter at issue was carefully read in its entirety with an
elementary level of understanding. 188 It also assumes that technically
false, immaterial representations are not likely to mislead the least
sophisticated consumer. 189 This standard protects debt collectors from
“bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection [letters] by preserving
[and presuming] a quotient of reasonableness and presuming a basic level
of understanding and willingness to read with care.” 190
The least sophisticated consumer standard dictates that the consumer
show more than his own confusion. 191 Instead, the consumer must show
that a significant fraction of the population would have been misled by the
content of the letter. 192 This requirement can be met through the use of
carefully designed and conducted consumer surveys or expert testimony. 193
Ultimately, a collection letter is considered “overshadowing or
183

See id.; Schneider v. TSYS Total Debt Mgmt., No. 06-C-345, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 48177, at *8 (E.D. Wis. July 13, 2006).
184
Bartlett, 128 F.3d at 499.
185
Id. at 500.
186
Ferree v. Marianos, No. 97-6061, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 30361, at *5 (10th Cir.
Nov. 3, 1997).
187
Carr v. Northland Grp., No. 3:12-CV-378, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174930, at *7
(E.D. Tenn. Dec. 11, 2012).
188
See Miller v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, 561 F.3d 588, 592 (6th Cir. 2009).
189
Donahue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2010).
190
Lesher v. Law Offices of Mitchell N. Kay, PC, 650 F.3d 993, 997 (3d Cir. 2011).
191
McKinney v. Cadleway Props., Inc., 548 F.3d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 2008). See also
Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 516 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2008).
192
McKinney, 548 F.3d at 503.
193
Id.; McMillan v. Collection Prof’ls, Inc., 455 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2006).
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contradictory if it would make the least sophisticated consumer uncertain
as to her rights.” 194 Successful overshadowing claims typically involve
collection letters, which imply that the consumer must take some action
contrary to her statutory right to demand verification within the thirty-day
period without explaining how that action and the right to demand
verification tie together. 195
Where a collection letter is plainly misleading, the FDCPA creates
liability without extrinsic proof. 196 In other words, “if it is apparent” that
the letter is confusing and plaintiff credibly testifies that he was confused,
“no further evidence is necessary to create a triable issue.” 197 It is only
where “the letter itself does not plainly reveal that it would be confusing to
a significant fraction of the population” that “the plaintiff must come
forward with evidence beyond the letter and . . . his own self-serving
[testimony] that the letter is confusing.” 198

III. CONCLUSION
Consumers should not be afraid or reluctant to deal with debt
collectors. Rather, they should face the fact with an understanding of their
rights and protections. Knowledge is power, and an informed consumer is
an empowered consumer.
Section 1692g of the FDCPA affords consumers the right to: (1) verify
the existence and “validity” of a debt; (2) dispute the debt “or any portion
thereof”; and, (3) obtain “the name and address of the . . . creditor, if
different from the [original] creditor.” 199 Consumers may exercise these
rights without providing any reasons or explanations to collectors. 200 If a
consumer notifies a debt collector in writing within the thirty-day statutory
period, the debt collector has two options. 201 It can “provide the requested
194
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validation[] and continue . . . collect[ion] [efforts],” or it can “cease all
collection activities.” 202
The language of § 1692g (a)(1)-(5) is plain, simple, and concise. 203
Nevertheless, some debt collectors find it difficult to comply with its
straightforward mandates. 204 Consequently, § 1692g has become one of
the most litigated sections of the FDCPA. 205 In response to the abundance
of litigation, the Seventh Circuit in Bartlett v. Heibl, 206 offered the
following form letter, which adheres to the requirements of the FDCPA.
That letter, in pertinent part, provides:
Federal law gives you thirty days after you receive this
letter to dispute the validity of the debt or any part of it. If
you don’t dispute it within that period, I’ll assume that it’s
valid. If you do dispute it—by notifying me in writing to
that effect—I will, as required by the law, obtain and mail
to you proof of the debt. And if, within the same period,
you request in writing the name and address of your
original creditor, if the original creditor is different from
the current creditor (Micard Service), I will furnish you
with that information too. 207
Judge Posner, writing for the court, also advised and admonished debt
collectors as follows:
We cannot require debt collectors to use “our” form. But
of course if they depart from it, they do so at their risk.
Debt collectors who want to avoid suits by disgruntled
debtors standing on their statutory rights would be well
advised to stick close to the form that we have drafted. It
would be a safe haven for them, at least in the Seventh
Circuit. 208

202
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Despite the template offered by the court in Bartlett, debt collectors
continue to take liberties with the validation notices of the FDCPA. 209
This raises the question: “why?” The blatantly academic answer is that the
FDCPA does not require collectors to use the verbatim language or format
of the statute. 210 The practical answer is that debt collection has become a
lucrative business. The debt collection industry is worth an estimated 17
billion dollars. 211 The economics of the industry dictates that debt
collectors must be vigilant and innovative in the methods they use to
navigate and circumvent the law. The only recourse left to consumers is to
know their rights and demand accountability from those members of the
industry not willing to play by the rules.

209

See supra text accompanying note 1.
Fariasantos v. Rosenberg & Assocs., LLC, No. 3:13CV543, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
30898 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2014) (citing Vitullo v. Mancini, 684 F. Supp. 2d. 747, 756 & n.
11 (E.D. Va. 2010)).
211
U.S. Debt Collections Industry Worth $12.2 Billion: Plenty of Accounts, But It’s
Tougher To Collect, Says Marketdata, PRWEB, http://www.prweb.com/releases/
prweb9383739.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).
210

